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Toward the Construction of Theology: 
Response to Richard McKeon 
Michael Buckley, S.J. I Jesuit School of Theology, 
Berkeley 
The accomplishment of genius is both resource and inspiration: re-
source, because achievement lies like an endless quarry from which the 
future will draw and with which it will build; inspiration, because 
greatness stands as the embodiment of value, as an abiding influence 
which calls upon subsequent human effort. Accomplishment indicates 
what can be done, but one never repeats the past. To attempt to repeat is 
to play false even to that historical moment which was not itself the 
repetition of its predecessor .. The past is not the present, nor can it be 
made to function for the urgencies and problems that are now. They are 
simply different kinds of time. But the foundational persuasion of 
humanistic education is that the past does continue to exist and to 
instruct within the present. It is within this context that I should like to 
comment upon Richard McKeon's paper. 
McKeon has sketched something of the achievement of Bonaventure 
and Aquinas. He has joined them not to demonstrate that one was right 
and the other wrong, but to indicate the extraordinary comprehension 
of both: the integration within their theologies of the divergent enter-
prises of science, history, and philosophy; the uniqueness, energies, and 
methodological strengths of each and the complementarity of both. 
McKeon has called his outline an inquiry rather than an exposition; it is 
an investigation which he invites others to join to discover the bearing of 
these works upon the problematic of our times. This is to move our 
discussion from simply studying Saint Thomas or Saint Bonaventure to 
studying under them. I should like to take up this invitation in my 
comment upon the middle section of his paper. Rather than analyze 
each statement or the interpretation of each historical fact, I should like 
© 1978 by The University of Chicago. 0022-4189/78/5805-0004/$01.09 
S52 
Toward the Construction of Theology 
to continue the lines of his inquiry as it provides the resources for 
contemporary theology. 
My thesis is that this can be done in three ways. 
1. The restoration of theology as an architectonic knowledge, as a 
wisdom different from and in serious interconnection with the other arts 
and sciences of man. 
2. The establishment within theology of universal theological arts, 
that is, arts in the medieval sense of disciplines and methods, skills which 
permeate and are employed in all theological reflection: systematic, 
constructive, moral, ascetical, liturgical, comparative, and legal. I pro-
pose that among these arts, present and busy, are: hermeneutics or 
semantics, methodology, philosophy, and history. 
3. The derivation of theology out of the specifically religious inquiries 
of men, that is, that theology attend more seriously and more carefully to 
the occasions of its existence and vitality in the religious experience and 
desires of men, in the movement of man toward God or in the 
movement of God toward man. 
' Let me explain each briefly. 
McKeon has noted that theology was in vital contact with the sciences 
and arts of the thirteenth century. Bonaventure and Aquinas main-
tained and insisted upon this contact, but did so in radically different 
ways. Bonaventure "reduced"-led back-all of the sciences to theol-
ogy and theology to the mystical possession of God. This was not simply 
because any knowledge which stopped short of God's revelation in 
Christ and which attempted completeness and autonomy was finally 
false. 1 More important, one must enter dialectically into each human 
inquiry and demonstrate that these knowledges were particularizations 
of the light which enlightens every man and which drives him to discover 
various meanings: from artifacts to natural forms to intellectual truths to 
truths that save "because the multiform wisdom of God, which is lucidly 
taught in sacred Scripture, is hidden in every knowledge and in every 
1 "Philosophica scientia via est ad alias scientias; sed qui ibi vult stare cadit in tenebras" 
(De donis spiritus sancti 4.4). The edition of Bonaventure used throughout these comments is 
that of the Opera omnia (Ad Clara Aquas [Quaracchi]: Ex Typographia Collegii S. 
Bonaventurae, 1882-1902; hereafter cited by volume number and page) (5:475b-476a). 
Cf. "Christus unus omnium magister," par. 15. (5:57lb). "Si ergo ad notitiam creaturae 
pervenire non potest, nisi per id, per quod facta est, necesse est ut verbum verax praecedat te, 
in Ecclesiastico" (In hex<iemeron l.10 [5:33la]). Cf. In hex<iem. 1.17 (5:332); 4.1 (5:349a); 
6.2-4 (5:360b-36lb); 7.1-14 (5:365a-367b). The third Collatio puts the position strongly 
and succinctly: "Unde omnes, qui non habet hanc fidem, manum habet amputatam" (In 
hexaem. 3.9 [5:345aD. 
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nature .... And it is also clear how full is this way of illumination and how 
in everything which is sensed or known, interius lateat ipse Deus." 2 Sacred 
Scripture is the key because each thing in its deepest truth resembles the 
Word of God in which it was uttered, and so each thing can suggest the 
ways in which men should live and the mystical union between God and 
the soul. 3 The organic unity of the sciences with theology in Bonaven-
ture lies both in the illumination out of which they come and in Christ 
who is the radix intelligentiae omnium. 4 As Christ, the Incarnate Word of 
God, is the reality in which all things are created, so to know them in any 
depth is to know them in him. He is the medium of all sciences. 5 It would 
be difficult to exaggerate the centrality of Christ in Bonaventure. 6 He is 
2 "Et sic patet, quomodo multiformis sapientia Dei (Eph. 3: 10), quae lucide traditur in 
sacra Scriptura, occultatur in omni cognitione et in omni natura. Patel etiam, quomodo 
omnes cognitiones famulantur theologiae; et ideo ipsa assumit exempla et utitur vocabulis 
pertinentibus ad omne genus cognitionis. Patel etiam, quam ampla sit via illuminative, et 
quomodo in omni re, quae sentitur sive quae cognoscitur, interius lateat ipse Deus" (De 
reductione artium ad theologi,am 26 [5:325b]; cf. ibid. 7 [5:322al). Reduction can mean various 
things in Bonaventure: "reduci est ad aliquid duplicitur: aut sicut ad principium, aut sicut 
ad terminum" (In I sent. 26.3, ad l [I :458]). Fernando Gneo comments: "Anzitutto va 
ricordato che s. Bonaventura usa ii termine reductio in contesti molto differenti (Gilson ne 
conta ben cinque). Ma in fondo, la reductio e sempre propria di una realta incapace di 
sussistenza assoluta e besognosa di un riferimento ad altro da cui, pertanto, e essenzial-
mente distinta. Quindi la reductio prende la dimensione di una vera e propria mediazione 
(fondazione e razionalizzazione) de! dato che altrimenti resterebbe infondato. 'Verbum ... 
est medium metaphysicum reducens, et haec est tota nostra metaphysica ... scilicet 
illuminari per radios spirituales et reduci ad summum.' In hexaem., 1.17" (Fernando Gneo, 
"La reductio artium ad theologiam secondo S. Bonaventura," in Arts liberaux et philosophic au 
moyen age, Actes du Quatrieme Congres International de Philosophie Medievale [Montreal: 
Institut d'Etudes Medievales, 1969], pp. 634-35; hereafter cited as ALP MA). This same 
organic unity of the sciences moving toward the vision of God is the object of development 
in De donis spiritus sancti 4.2 ff. (5:4 74a ff.). 
3 De reductione artium ad theologiam 5 (5:32 la). 
4 "Horum ostium est intellectus Verbi increati, qui est radix intelligentiae omnium; 
unde qui non habet hoc ostium, intrare non potest. Philosophi autem habent pro impossibili 
quae sunt summe vera, quia ostium est eis clausum" (In hexaem. 3.4 [5:343bl). Christ as the 
source of the illumination of the sciences entitles him alone to be called "teacher." "Merito 
igitur soli Christo et non alii attribuenda est auctoritas officii, ut singulariter unus Magister 
dicatur, eo quod ipse est fontale principium et origo scientiae humanae. Under sicut unus 
est sol, tamen moltos radios emittit; sic ab uno Magistro, Christo, sole spirituali, mul-
tiformes et distincti rivuli ab uno fonte egrediuntur, unus tamen est fons, qui in tot rivulos 
sine sui defectibilitate (se) multiplicat; sic ab uno fonte aeterno ab uno Magistro, Christo, 
sine sui defectibilitate egrediuntur rivuli diversarum scientiarum" (Sermo i, Dominica xxii 
post Pentecostem, "Magister, scimus quia verax es et viam Dei in veritate doces" [9:442a]; 
cf. "Christus, unus omnium magister" 7-9 [5:569a-bl). 
5 "Propositum igitur nostrum est ostendere, quod in Christo sunt omnes thesauri 
sapientiae et scientiae Dei absconditi (Col. 2.3), et ipse est medium omnium scientiarum" 
(In hexaem. 1.11 [5:33 lal). The remainder of this initial Collatio is devoted to demonstrating 
that Christ is the medium for metaphysics, physics, mathematics, logic, ethics, politics, and 
theology. 
8 "Secundo docet, ubi debet incipere: quia a media, quod est Christus: quod medium si 
negligatur, nihil habetur" (In hexaem. l.l [5:329]). 
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the ultimate intelligibility or meaning of each thing-and so the inquiry 
of any science only reaches a definitive or stable grasp of its subject 
matter when it is found in its relationship to Christ, the integral subject 
of theology. 7 
Aquinas, in sharp contrast, distinguishes irreducibly among the sci-
ences in terms of their proper subject matter, but unites them theologi-
cally without annihilating these distinctions. There was that theology 
which was metaphysics, whose essential function as first philosophy was 
the analytic examination and establishment of the initial presuppositions 
of all the other sciences: their initial assertions, axiomatic sets, founda-
tional prerequisites, and primitive concepts. 8 There was that other 
theology, or sacra doctrina, whose relationship with philosophy or the 
sciences was threefold: 
Therefore in sacra doctrina we are able to employ philosophy in three ways. First, 
to demonstrate those things which are the preambles of faith, which it is 
necessary to know in faith, as those things which can be established by natural 
reasons about God, as for example that God is, that He is one, and other things of 
this type or whatever is established about either God or man in philosophy, which 
faith presupposes. Secondly, to clarify through some resemblances those things 
which are of faith, as Augustine in his work On the Trinity employs resemblances 
taken from philosophic teachings to clarify the trinity. Thirdly, to resist those who 
speak against the faith, either by showing those things to be false or by showing 
that they are not necessary. 9 
7 "Clavis ergo contemplationis est intellect us triplex, scilicet intellect us Verbi increati, per 
quod omnia producuntur; intellectus Verbi incarnati, per quod omnia reparantur; intellec-
tus Verbi inspirati per quod omnia revelantur. Nisi enim quis possit considerare de rebus, 
qualiter originantur, qualiter in finem reducuntur, et qualiter in eis refulget Deus, 
intelligentiam habere non potest" (In hexaem. 3.2 [5:343aD. For Christ as the integral 
subject of theology, cf. In I Sent., Prooemium I (1:76). For this reason, only theology or 
sacra doctrina was a scientia perfecta, "quia incipit a primo, quod est primum principium, et 
pervenit ad ultimum, quod est praemium aeternum .... " It is as perfect wisdom that it 
completes what philosophy can only begin: "lpsa enim sola est sapientia perfecta, quae 
incipit a causa summa, ut est principium causatorum, ubi terminatur cognitio philosophi-
ca; et transit per earn, ut est remedium peccatorum; et reducit in earn, ut est praemimum 
meritorum et finis desideriorum" (Breviloquium I.I [5:310a-b]). 
8 "De quibus omnibus est theologia, id est scientia divina, quia praecipuum in ea 
cognitorum est deus. Quae alio nomine dicitur metaphysica, id est trans physicam, quia 
post physicam discenda occurrit nobis, quibus ex sensibilibus oportet in insensibilia 
devenire. Dictur etiam philosophia prima, in quantum aliae omnes scientiae ab ea sua 
principia accepientes earn consequuntur" (Expositio super librum Boethii de trinitate 5.1.c 
[hereafter cited as In de trin.]; cf. In metaphysicam Aristotelis commentarium, Prooemium. S.T., 
I, 1,8.) Yet the sciences remain irreducibly distinct from each other and metaphysics. Cf. In 
de trin. 5.1, ad 6. 
9 "Sic ergo in sacra doctrina philosophia possum us tripliciter uti. Primo ad demonstran-
dum ea quae sunt preambula fidei, quae necesse est in fide scire, ut ea quae naturalibus 
rationibus de deo probantur, ut deum esse, deum esse unum et alia huiusmodi vel de deo 
vel de creaturis in philosophia probata, quae fides supponit. Secondo ad notificandum per 
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What Aquinas is elaborating is an intimate unity without a reduction. 10 
Philosophic reflection or science stands as the human propaedeutic to 
the initiations of sacred teaching in faith; sacra doctrina conjoins its own 
inquiries with the philosophic for the disclosures of its own subject 
matter; and finally theology, judging the products of other inquiries as 
coordinate with or repugnant to its own evidence, turns to philosophic 
investigation for the examination of these contradicting positions. For 
Aquinas, theology integrates the work of the other sciences like a 
medieval cathedral, not by identifying with them or transposing them 
into theology, but by giving them an order, a context in man's radical 
orientation toward truth, since it belongs to wisdom to give order and 
judgment. 11 
My point is not that either Bonaventure or Aquinas is uniquely 
correct, but that both of them make theology a different kind of thing, 
an architectonic knowledge in serious and systematic sympathy with the 
sciences and arts of these times. The Summa Theologiae or the Reductio 
Artium ad Theologiam evince this contact, and the varieties of other 
possible ways in which this conjunction could emerge are indicated within 
the writings of their colleagues and successors. 
This is not the case in contemporary theology-and not because 
"knowledge has expanded beyond the possibility of a single man to 
comprehend what is known." I suspect that this has been the case for 
thousands of years. Rather, since the Renaissance, theology has attempt-
aliquas similitudines ea quae sunt fidei, sicut Augustinus in libro de Trinitate utitur multis 
similitudinibus ex doctrina philosophicis sumptis ad manifestandum trinitatem. Tertio ad 
resistendum his quae contra £idem dicuntur sive ostendendo ea esse falsa sive ostendendo 
ea non esse necessaria" In de trin. 2.3. 
10 "Aquinas makes the contrast between the two ways of ordering the sciences explicitly: 
" ... aliarum scientiarum principia vel sunt per se nota, et probari non possunt: vel per 
aliquam rationem naturalem probantur in aliqua alia scientia. Propria autem hujus 
scientiae cognitio est, quae est per revelationem: non autem quae est per naturalem 
rationem. Et ideo non pertinet ad earn probare principia aliarum scientiarum, sed solum 
iudicare de eis: quidquem enim in aliis scientiis invenitur veritati huius scientiae repugnans, 
totum condemnatur ut falsum: unde dicitur II Cor. 10 [4]: consilia destruentes, et 
omnem altitudinem extollentem se ad versus scientiam Dei" (S. T. I, 1,6, ad 2). The further 
and more positive relationship of sacra doctrina to secular knowledge is explained in a pre-
vious answer to an objection." ... haec scientia accipere potest aliquid a philosophicis 
disciplinis, non quod ex necessitate eis indigeat, sed ad maiorem manifestationem eorum 
quae in hac scientia traduntur. Non enim accipit sua _principia ab aliis scientiis, sed im-
mediate a Deo per revelationem. Et ideo non accipit ab aliis scientiis tanquam a superioribus, 
sed utitur eis tanquam inferioribus et ancillis; sicut architectonicae utuntur subministranti-
bus, ut civilis militari. Et hoc ipsum quod sic utitur eis, non est propter defectum vel 
insufficientiam eius, sed propter defectum intellectus nostri; qui ex his quae per naturalem 
rationem (ex qua procedunt aliae scientiae) cognoscuntur, facilius manuducitur in ea quae 
sunt supra rationem, quae in hac scientia traduntur" (S.T. 1,1,5, ad 2). 
11 "Cum enim sapientis sit ordinare et iudicare ... " (S.T. I, 1,6; cf. In meta., Prooemium). 
For the fundamental relationship between faith and truth, cf. S.T. 11-11,l,1. 
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ed to become a "science," as opposed to a "wisdom," that is, a specialized 
knowledge alongside of others, one knowledge among many, sometimes 
forensic, sometimes constructive, often out of touch with scientific 
investigations or finding itself more threatened than enriched by the 
new science. The physics and mathematics of the thirteenth century posed 
enormously vital questions to theology as it touched upon the transcen-
dence or simplicity of God, the nature of infinity, or the reality of 
Christ. It would be difficult to trace a similar dialogue in the nineteenth 
century, as the location for theology had often become the isolated 
seminary or the professional and self-sustaining divinity school, with 
textbooks become polemical and parochial, theology feeding off theol-
ogy, theology responding to other theologies. 12 Even today, despite the 
enormous changes within divinity studies, it remains true to assert that, 
by and large, systematic theologians are relatively unimportant within 
American intellectual culture, that they neither enlighten nor contex-
tualize vitally what we are about, and that the architectonic has passed to 
sociology, education, and psychology, to novelists such as Thomas Mann 
or James Joyce, or to philosophies such as existentialism or the positivism 
of the unified sciences. 
If this is true, then the rearticulation of the architectonic is one of the 
primary tasks of contemporary theological methodology: How can 
theology engage the other disciplines, the arts and sciences, the various 
works of men? One will not repeat the solutions of Bonaventure and 
Aquinas because our questions are different, but move to a resolution 
structured by variant theological methodologies and occasioned by the 
uniqueness of our problems. Much of the vitality and the energy of 
theology should issue from the questions and concepts, the experiences 
and reflections that at first sight have nothing to do with theology, which 
emerge from men in the vastly different aspects of the human, gathering 
a depth of contact with the human even more effectively when it is 
mediated through the arts and sciences, mediated by study, discipline, 
and refinement. 
II 
But this is not enough if theology is to exist as an academic and serious 
knowledge. It must not only be related to the other sciences, but it must 
possess a reflective seriousness about its own procedure which would 
insure the validity and strength of its assertions. Another reason that so 
12 Cf. the judgment of Father Charles E. Curran in his presidential address to the 
Catholic Theological Society of America (Detroit, June 15-18, 1970), in Proceedings of the 
Twenty-Fifth Annual Convention (Bronx, N.Y., 1970), pp. 219-20. 
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much constructive theology fails to tell upon the culture lies with the 
internal weakness of the discipline. Would it be unfair to maintain that 
theologies rise as quickly as a passion and then as easily slip from 
presence and memory, that terms are used casually and emotively, that 
hard evidence is often wanting or mingled indiscriminately with conclu-
sions, that historical assertions are oversimplified to the point of parody, 
that current prejudices are rhetorically engaged, and that sweeping 
generalizations are made whose warrant seems slender upon analysis? 13 
McKeon has indicated how the development and application of the 
liberal arts-exegetical grammar, judicative rhetoric, with logic or 
dialectic-led to the formation of a theology, moving from the resolu-
tions of discordant canons to the elaboration of sententiae, initially 
through a Sic et non and then through the compilations of Peter 
Lombard. What I should like to argue is that our contemporary theology 
could well take a leaf from this history, that our discussions of 
methodological reform within theology might learn from the develop-
ment of those hundreds of years in which systematic theology was 
emerging. A new articulation and application of the liberal arts to 
theology in the form of "theological arts" could steady and strengthen a 
discipline which often seems vague and inconsequential. This would not 
be to impose an a priori procedure upon theology, but to induce and 
generalize what are already pervasive skills in the workings of the better 
theologians; what I should like to suggest is that these need to be 
articulated, specified, established, regulated, and interrelated if theology 
is to deal in a careful, productive manner with serious meaning and 
truth. 14 I should list at least four. 
First, hermeneutics or semantics-what the Middle Ages often called 
grammar and which Marius Victorious followed by Rabanus Maurus 
defined as the scientia interpretandi. 15 It is the primary ability to deal with 
13 Cf. ibid., pp. 220-24. 
14 It is critically important not to read into the medieval artes liberates the doctrines and 
practices of the twentieth century on humanistic education. In the Middle Ages, the liberal 
arts were universal skills or developed abilities or disciplines which could be brought to 
bear upon any subject matter. Cf. Richard P. McKeon, "The Transformation of the Liberal 
Arts in the Renaissance," in Developments in the Early Renaissance, ed. Bernard S. Levi 
(Albany: State University of New York Press, 1972), pp. 164-68. Aquinas agrees with 
Hugh of St. Victor that these arts must first be learned by anyone who wishes to do 
philosophic reflection (cf. In de trin. 5.1). Contrast this approach with the more content-
oriented approach of Yves M.-J. Congar, O.P.,A History of Theology, trans. and ed. Hunter 
Guthrie, SJ. (Garden City, N.Y.: Doubleday & Co., 1968), pp. 12-14. 
15 Maximi (sic) Victorini, De arte grammatica. "Grammatica quid est? Scientia inter-
pretandi poetas atque historicos et rects scribendi loquendi ratio" (cf. Heinrich Keil, ed., 
Grammatica Latini [Lipsiae: Teubner, 1855-80), 6: 188). The attribution of De arte gram-
matica is notoriously problematic. For an identical definition, see Audacis, De scauri et 
palladii libris exerpta per interrogationem et responsionem, ibid., 7:321. While Donatus himself 
does not define grammar, Sergius does, commenting upon Donatus: "Ars grammatica 
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structures of meaning, of symbols within their own context as well as 
within their effective histories and successive applications, and of literary 
form, so that poetic statement is not physics and mathematics is not 
theology. It is both the ability to receive and the ability to author, to read 
and to speak (write) in such a way that the symbols deliver meaning, that 
what is read or what is said "makes sense." This skill in interpretation is 
imperative not only for biblical criticism as Formgeschichte or Redak-
tionsgeschichte, but also for the writings of Fathers or councils and, 
through philosophical semantics, the history of philosophic thought. It is 
not a mastery of each of these fields, but a theological discipline which 
enables one to move through these texts with sensitivity and insight, 
looking for clues and pluralistic meanings within the abiding richness of 
statements, without simple-minded reduction of assertions to a single 
series of meanings or nonsense. 
Second, methodology or argumentation. In the second book of his 
Eruditio didascalica or Didascalicon, Hugh of St. Victor collapses the 
distinction between rhetoric and dialectic to allow the former Ciceronian 
understanding of rhetoric to emerge: an ability to investigate either by 
discovery or invention and to articulate, order, and revise what has been 
obtained. 16 Methodology as a pervasive art within theology should be, 
praecipue cons1st1t m intellectu poetarum et in recte scribendi loquendi ratione." 
Explanationum in artum donati, ibid., 4:486. Cf. also Aspri, Grammtici ars: "Grammatica est 
scientia recte scribendi et enunciandi interpretandique poetas per historiam formatam ad 
usum rationemque verborum" (ibid., 5:547). Dosithei Magistri, Ars grammatica: "Ars 
grammatica est scientia emendati sermonis in loquendo et scribendo poematumque ac 
lectionis prudens praeceptum" (ibid., 7:376). It was this tradition that Rabanus Maurus 
recapitulates for the Middles Ages in the De clericorum institutione, in which he repeats the 
definition of Marius Victorin us and applies this art to scriptural interpretation. The cleric 
must learn the figures such as "allergoria, aenigma, parabola. Quorum omnium cognition 
propterea Scripturarum ambiguitatibus dissolvendis est necessaria quia sensus ad pro-
pietatem verborum sic accipiatur, absurdus est" (De clericorum institutione, 3.18; PL 107: 
395b). Baldwin maintains thatgrammatica dominated the trivium until a shift of emphasis 
began in the eleventh century. Medieval Rhetoric and Poetic (New York: Macmillan Co., 
1928). John of Salisbury urges grammatical studies in the model of Bernard of Chartres, 
which was the interpretations, imitation, and discussion of great writings ()W.etalogicon 
1.24. PL 199:853 ff.). For the subsequent history of the use of grammar in the Middle 
Ages, see J. Reginald O'Donnell, "The Liberal Arts in the Twelfth Century with Special 
Reference to Alexander Nequam," ALPMA, pp. 126-35, with the discussion which follows 
on pp. 148-56. See also, in the same volume, Heinrich Roos, "Le Trivium a l'universite 
au Xllle siecle," pp. 193-97 and the discussion which follows on pp. 198-203. 
18 Hugonis de S. Victore, Eruditionis didascalicae 2.31. "Ratio disserendi integrates partes 
habet, inventionem etjudicium; divisas vero, demonstrationem, probabilem, sophisticam. 
Demonstratio est in necessariis argumentis, et pertinet ad philosophos. Probabilit pertinet 
ad dialecticos et ad rhetores. Sophistica ad sophistas et cavillatores. Probabilis dividitur in 
dialecticam et rhetoricam, quarum utraque integrates habet partes inventionem et 
judicium. Quia enim ipsum genus, id est artem dissertivam, integraliter constituunt, necesse 
est ut in compositione omnium specierum ejus simul inveniatur. Inventio est quae docet 
invenire argumenta et constituere argumentationes. Scientia judicandi, quae de utroque, 
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similarly, either the ability to establish or discover evidence orto search 
out the implications and entailments of evidence; it formulates genuine 
questions and provides for a clear movement toward the foundations of 
discussion or the area of investigation and a precision or modesty about 
what is asserted in consequence of the data given or the facts formu-
lated. In both Bonaventure and Aquinas, argumentation and its eviden-
tial basis are precise, and the question to be treated is carefully 
determined. Thus, each resolution is open to counterargument on either 
the meaning of terms, the adequacy of evidence, or the movement of 
thought. 17 Methodology as an art would not set out the various pro-
judicare docet" (PL 176:764; emphasis mine). It was this combination of rhetoric and 
dialectic which was the "dissertive art" and which with grammar formed the trivium, which 
Hugh called logica. Thus he can write: "Logica dividitur in grammaticam et disertivam [sic]. 
Dissertiva divitur in demonstrationem probabilem et sophisticam. Probabilis dividitur in 
dialecticam et rhetoricam" (Eruditiones didascalicae 3.1; PL l 76:765). 
17 The formative influence of the liberal arts on Aquinas is interesting to trace through 
his studies at the University of Naples. Peter Calo notes that he was sent to Naples "ut esset 
grammatica, dyalectica, et rhetorica eruditus adprime." This purpose was somewhat 
aborted, as none of the early biographers mention any study of rhetoric. While they agree 
that Aquinas's studies in the trivium were confined to grammar and logic, they disagree 
about the division among instructors. Peter Calo: "Nam cum martinum praeceptorem in 
grammatica in brevi excederet, traditus est magistro petro ybernico, qui in Iogicalibus et 
naturalibus eum instruxit" (Vita 4, Fontes vitae S. Thomae Aquinatis, curia et Iabore D. 
Prummer, O.Pr. [Saint Maximin (Var): Revue Thomiste, 1911-], fasc. I. p. 20; hereafter 
cited as Fontes). William of Tocco: "Uncle puer de utriusque parentis consilio Neapolim 
mittitur, ut sub Magistri Martini grammaticalibus et logicalibus, et Magisteri Petri de 
Ibernia studiis in naturalibus edocetur" (Vita 5, Fontes, fasc. 2, p. 70). Bernardus Guidonis: 
". . . persuasit parentibus ejus ut neapolim mitteretur ad studium liberalibus artibus 
imbeundus .... In brevi itque tempore cum in grammaticalibus et logicalibus ac in naturali 
philosphia plurimum profecisset ... " (Vita 4, Fontes, fasc. 3, p. l 70). Why no study of 
rhetoric? Perhaps the clue lies with Peter of Ireland. There is an unedited manuscript in 
the Vatican library which may cast some light upon this absence, Peter's commentary upon 
the Isagoge and Aristotle's On Interpretation entitled Scriptum super porfirium peremeneaas 
magistri petri de ybernia conventus Jrarum minorum de Bononia. Peter writes: "Amplius autem 
ad scientiam rationalem transire oportet. sed quia naturales scientie non sunt presentis 
intentionis omissis illis ad rationalem scientiam transeamus. est ergo notandum quod de 
signis oportuit haberi scientiam. signum enim idem est quod sermo, sed <licit plato in timeo 
quod sermones inventi sunt ut per ipsos presto sint mutue voluntatis iudicia. et <licit tullius 
in secunda rhetorica quod sapientia sine (?) eloquentia est quasi gladius in manu paralitici. 
eloquentia vero sine sapientia est quasi gladius in manu furibundi. ideo non solum oportuit 
havere scientias reales ad sapientiam ordinatas ideo etiam scientias sermocinales ad 
eloquentiam ordinatas et sic includitur evidenter quod non sufficiunt scientie reales nisi 
habeamus sermocinales sive rationales. possunt autem sermocinales scientie distingui 
diversimode secundum diversas acceptationes sermonis. in sermone enim sunt tria subiecta 
sermonis: veritas, bonitas, sive decor. primo modo de sermone est grammatica; secundo 
modo, logica; tertio modo rhetorica. vel aliter quod sermonis proprietates quedam 
sumuntur a parte vocis sive significati generalis, ut congruum et incongruum; quedam 
vero ex parte specialis significati in complexione unius ad alterum, et huiusmodi est ... ; 
autem alia passio que significatur sequitur in respectu ad nos ut persuasio. primo modo, 
grammatica; secundo modo, logica; tertio rhetorica. nam rhetoris officium est persuadere 
iudici ut moveat ipsum ad partis adverse indignationem et ad sue partis favorem" (Vat. lat. 
5988; punctuation added). For Peter, rhetoric dealt with beauty or ornamentation rather 
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cedures of the diverse divisions within theology; that should be the 
function of the subject and problems of each. Nor does it indicate a 
mastery of each of these methods. It is, rather, a pervasive skill or a 
sensitivity to argument and to evidence, to the strength of conclusions 
and their warrants within data, and, negatively, to the substitutions of 
sophistry, pretensions, and empty claims. 
Third, philosophy. McKeon maintains that it was the dialectic or logic 
of Peter Abailard which turned attention to the truth of statements, to 
consideration of what they were about. 18 Philosophy became in the 
Middle Ages the "art of arts and discipline of disciplines," and as a 
theological art it can still serve this analytic function of searching out the 
basic principles and assertions about reality which are presupposed 
whenever one puts a predicate upon a subject or engages in an action of 
freedom. 19 Theology, as any human enterprise, is ineluctably involved in 
philosophic commitments, in an ontology which distinguishes the real 
from the unreal or in an ethics which involves motive and value. The 
choice before the reflective mind is not whether such philosophic 
commitments will be present; they will always be present. The choice is 
whether this abiding presence will be attended to and articulated and 
open to correction. Philosophy, precisely as a skill, as an ability brought 
to bear upon significant discourse or valued action, is a perception of the 
ultimate dimensions of experience and things, of thought and intention, 
or of terms and categories either admitted or assumed. 
And, finally, history: the ability to deal with change and sequence in 
human development, whether it be the history of a people or a church, 
the evolution of a concept like "person" or "substance," or the matura-
tion of personal religious experience. 20 History as an art is not a mastery 
of one particular field or series of narrations, though it may be learned 
through such a mastery. It is, rather, a kind of consciousness which 
studies things in their development. With such a historical conscious-
than with truth or goodness and not so much with the intrinsic meaning of the text, but 
rather with its effect upon an audience. Perhaps we can guess for these reasons that Saint 
Thomas was moved from dialectic or logic directly to the study of natural philsophy. 
18 So also Ludwig Hodl: "Das will heissen: diese Momente und die <lurch sie bedingte 
aussere und innere Gestalt der scholastischen Theologie riihren von der Oberformung der 
Theologie <lurch die Dialektik der Artes liberales her. Im 12. Jahrhundert verdichtete sich 
das Artes-Wissen in der Dialektik und normierte so als dialektische Erkenntnis auch die 
Theologie, aber nicht nur sie, auch die Jurisprudenz, und die Medizin standen in Banne 
der Dialektik" ("Die Dialektische Theologie des 12.Jahrhunderts," ALPMA, p. 138). 
19 Hugh of St. Victor cites this as a standard definition of philosophy: "Aliter: 'Philisophi 
est ars artium, et disciplina disciplinarum,' ad quam omnes artes et disciplinae spectant" 
(Eruditiimis didascalicae 2: I. PL 176:751). 
• 0 History as a liberal art did not emerge until the Renaissance transformed the liberal 
arts from a command of methods to a command of certain subject matters or fields. For 
this change, see McKeon (n. 14 above), pp. 166 and l 75. 
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ness, one deals much more with themes in their vanat1ons through 
diverse patterns in the evolutions and declines of theology rather than as 
univocal statements and repeated actions. 
It seems to me that these basic skills should be part of every 
theologian's work. They are not simply functional specialities which spell 
each other off in a concatenated progression of a single work, "successive 
stages in a process from data to result." 21 Not that they contradict the 
division of theology into functional specialities. What they attempt is 
quite different: skills employed simultaneously and in mutual involve-
ment on work that is significantly theological. As the emergence of the 
liberal arts led to the formulation of the theologies of Aquinas and of 
Bonaventure, my argument is that a careful formulation of theological 
arts could have a similar revitalizing effect upon contemporary 
theology. 22 
III 
Besides the implications of theology as a wisdom among other knowl-
edges and the internal energizing of theology with careful and educated 
habits or arts, there remain the context, the sensibilities and intentions, 
the questions or issues out of which it arises. For Bonaventure and 
Aquinas, these were deeply religious: the desire of a man to be with God, 
the movement of man toward the ecstatic possession of God in contem-
plative love. McKeon has emphasized strongly Bonaventure's way of 
aff ectivity, which Bonaventure himself contrasted to the speculative 
indifference of geometry: "Such is the knowledge which is taught in this 
book. For this knowledge aids faith, and faith is in the intellect in such a 
way that by its very nature it is oriented to move affectivity. And this is 
obvious. For the knowledge that Christ has died for us and similar 
knowledge moves a man to love unless he is unmovable in his sins. This is 
not knowledge like that other, that the diameter is incommensurate with 
a side." 23 
Saint Thomas's answer read differently, but it also placed sacra doctrina 
within the context of man's religious act, his movement toward God. 
21 Bernard Lonergan,Method in Theology (New York: Herder & Herder, 1972), p. 126. 
22 These four theological arts are not unlike those disciplines elaborated at the University 
of Chicago in the Division of the Humanities and studied in four interdepartmental 
committees (see Richard P. McKeon, "Autobiography," in Thirteen Americans: Their Spiritual 
Autobiographies, ed. Louis Finkelstein [New York: Harper & Bros., 1953], pp. 90 ff.). 
23 "Talis est cognitio tradita in hoc libro. Nam cognitio haec iuvat fidem, et fides sic est in 
intellectu ut, quantum est de sui ratione, nata sit movere affectum. Et hoc patet. Nam haec 
cognitio: quod Christus pro nobis mortuus est, et consimiles, nisi sit homo peccator et 
durus, movet ad amorem; non sic ista: quod diameter est asymeter costae" (In I sent., 
Prooemii [I: 136]; cf. De reductione artium ad theologiam 26 [5:325bD. 
S62 
Toward the Construction of Theology 
Aquinas assigns the very necessity of this teaching to that inner orienta-
tion. 24 The focus of theology was principally upon God and only those 
aspects of human activity "through which a man is ordered to the perfect 
knowledge of God, in which eternal happiness consists." 25 
Again, this is a focus that could well be restored, not returned to the 
religious questions of the thirteenth centry but integrated in terms of the 
religious problematic of our own times: Where are you, my God, and 
how shall I find you? This searching question may arise from reflections 
upon the individual value of human life, the profound injustice in 
contemporary social and economic structures, the history of slaughter 
which our century has written, or the possibilities raised by the biologi-
cal, behavioral, and physical sciences. Perhaps the religious inquiry 
which characterizes our age is the quest for the silent, for the absent God 
through the study of religious experience and of the God who reveals 
himself in so many guises through these experiences and their conse-
quences. 
*** 
What I am proposing, then, in response to the inquiry of Richard 
McKeon-as a continuation of his inquiry-is that the achievements we 
celebrate now indicate lines for the development of contemporary 
theology: a theology which emerges from the religious sensibilities and 
questions of our own time, which is structured and energized by serious 
and careful employment of hermeneutics, methodology, philosophy, 
and history as permeating skills or theological arts, and which is in vital 
contact with the knowledges and works that men are about. 
24 S.T. 1,1,1. 
25 Ibid., 1,1,4. 
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